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SECURITY WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION: 
CARD COMPUTERS 
TO MAKE BIG BROTHER OBSOLETE 
You may soon use a personal "card computer" 
to handle all your payments and other transactions; 
it can protect your security and privacy in new ways, 
while benefitting organizations and society at large. 
David Chaum 
Computerization is robbing individuals of the abil-
ity to monitor and control the ways information 
about them is used. Already, public and private 
sector organizations acquire extensive personal 
information and exchange it amongst themselves. 
Individuals have no way of knowing if this infor-
mation is inaccurate, outdated, or otherwise inap-
propriate, and may only find out when they are 
accused falsely or denied access to services. New 
and more serious dangers derive from computer-
ized pattern recognition techniques: even a small 
group using these and tapping into data gathered 
in everyday consumer transactions could secretly 
conduct mass surveillance, inferring individuals' 
lifestyles, activities, and associations. The automa-
tion of payment and other consumer transactions is 
expanding these dangers to an unprecedented 
extent. 
Organizations, on the other hand, are 
attracted to the efficiency and cost-cutting oppor-
tunities of such automation. Moreover, they too 
are vulnerable, as when cash, checks, consumer 
credit, insurance, or social services are abused by 
individuals. The obvious solution for organizations 
is to computerize in ways that use more pervasive 
and interlinked records, perhaps in combination 
with national identity cards or even fingerprints. 
But the resulting potential for misuse of data would 
have a chilling effect on individuals. Nevertheless, 
this is essentially the approach of the electronic 
payment and other automated systems now being 
tried. Although these systems will require massive 
investment and years to complete, their underlying 
architecture is already quietly being decided and 
their institutional momentum is growing. 
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This momentum is driving us toward a seem-
ingly irreconcilable conflict, between organizations' 
need for security and the benefits of automation on 
one side, and individuals' need for ensured privacy 
and other protections on the other. But this 
conflict may be avoided by early adoption of a 
fundamentally different approach to automating 
transaction systems. This new approach is mutu-
ally advantageous: it actually increases organiza-
tions' benefits from automating, including 
improved security, while it frees individuals from 
the surveillance potential of data linking and other 
dangers of unchecked record keeping. Its more 
advanced techniques offer not only wider use at 
reduced cost, but also greater consumer conveni-
ence and protection. In the long run, it holds 
promise for enhancing economic freedom, the 
democratic process, and informational rights. 
The New Approach and How it Differs 
Three major differences define the new approach. 
The first is in the use of identifying information. 
Currently, many Western countries require citizens 
to carry documents bearing universal identification 
numbers. Drivers' licenses are being ·upgraded to 
perform a similar function in the United States, 
and efforts toward machine-readable national iden-
tity documents are expanding internationally. 
Meanwhile, organizations routinely use such essen-
tially identifying data as name, birthday, and 
birthplace or name and address to match or link 
their records with those of other organizations. 
Under the new approach, an individual uses 
a different account number or "digital pseu-
donym" with each organization. No other 
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identifying information is used. A casual purchase 
at a shop, for example, might be made under a 
one-time-use pseudonym; for a series of transac-
tions comprising an ongoing relationship, like a 
bank account, a single pseudonym would be used 
repeatedly. Because of the input individuals have 
into the process by which the pseudonyms are 
created, they are ensured that their pseudonyms 
cannot be linked. This input also yields them the 
exclusive ability to use, and authenticate ownership 
of, their pseudonyms. Organizations too can pro-
tect themselves through their participation in form-
ing the pseudonyms; among other safeguards, they 
can limit individuals to one pseudonym per organi-
zation and ensure that individuals are held 
accountable for abuses created under any of their 
pseudonyms. 
A second difference is in whose mechanism is 
used to conduct transactions. Today, individuals 
hold a variety of "tokens" issued to them by orga-
nizations. These range from traditional paper 
documents to plastic cards with magnetic or opti-
cal stripes or even embedded microcomputers. 
Such tokens are usually owned by the issuing orga-
nization and contain information that the indivi-
dual holder can neither decipher nor modify. 
With the spread of automatic teller and point-of-
sale terminals, individuals are being asked to per-
form more transactions directly using computer-
controlled equipment. These terminals, and even 
the microcomputers in some current tokens, are 
physically tamper-resistant and contain secret 
numeric keys that securely code their communica-
tion with central computers. Individuals derive lit-
tle direct benefit from these security provisions, 
however: in using such a transaction mechanism, 
they must take on faith the information it displays 
to them while revealing their own secrets to it. 
With the new approach, an individual con-
ducts transactions using a personal "card com-
puter." This might resemble a credit-card-sized 
calculator and include a character display, a key-
board, and a short-range communication capabil-
ity (like that of a television remote control). Such 
computers can be bought or even constructed, just 
like any other personal computer; they need have 
no secrets from, or structures unmodifiable by, 
their owners. They can also be as simple to use as 
automatic teller machines. During a purchase at a 
shop, for example, equipment at the point of sale 
transmits a description of the goods and cost to the 
card, which displays this information to its owner. 
The card owner allows the transaction simply by 
entering a secret authorizing number on the card's 
keyboard. This same number is used by the owner 
to allow each transaction; without it, a lost or 
stolen card computer would be of very little use. 
A lost card's full capabilities, however, could be 
readily installed in a replacement, using backup 
data saved in a secure, encoded form at home or 
elsewhere. 
The third defining difference is in the kind of 
security provided. Current systems emphasize the 
one-sided security of organizations attempting to 
organization 
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UNIVERSALLY IDENTIFYING NUMBERS or other equivalent Identifying Information Is presented by the lndlvldual 
card holder to each organization-In the current approach. Unrelated generic examples are shown of three kinds of 
transactions: communication, In which the indlvldual sends an authorizing message and receives a notifying mes-
sage; payment, In which the lndlvldual pays an organization or receives a payment; and credential, in which a 
certification that an Individual has some credentlal Is transferred from an organization 8 to an organization C. The 
Identifying lnformatlon-845-allows all transaction records to be linked together Into a dossier on the lndlvldual. 
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DIFFERENT NUMBERS OR DIGITAL PSEUDONYMS are used with each organization by a personal card computer 
that the Individual completely controls-under the new approach. The credential transfer Is no longer just between 
organizations: It must now go through the card where the pseudonym, 451, used with the Issuing organization B Is 
transformed to the pseudonym, 314, used with the receiving organization C. Systems using this approach can pro-
vide organizations with Improved protection against abuses by Individuals, and also allow Individuals to ensure that 
pseudonyms cannot be traced across the dashed boundary tines, thereby preventing dossier compilation. 
protect themselves from individuals, while the new 
approach allows all parties to protect their own 
interests. It relies both on individuals' card com-
puters withholding secret keys from organizations 
and on organizations' computers devising other 
secret keys that are withheld from individuals. 
During transactions, the parties use these keys to 
form specially coded confirmations of transaction 
details, the exchange of which yields evidence 
sufficient to resolve errors and disputes. 
The systems presented here for the new 
approach depend on currently used codes to secure 
organizations against abuses by individuals. Since 
these codes are "cryptographic," they can be bro-
ken, in principle, by trying enough guessed keys. 
Such guessing, however, is infeasible because of the 
enormous number of possible keys. In short, no 
proofs of security are known for these crypto-
graphic codes, but nor are any feasible attacks. By 
contrast, the security card computers provide for 
individuals against the linking of their pseudonyms 
is "unconditional": simple mathematical proofs can 
show that, with appropriate use of the systems, 
even collusion of all organizations and tapping of 
all communication lines could not yield enough 
information to link the pseudonyms- regardless of 
how clever the attack or how much computation it 
uses. 
In summary, if large scale automated systems 
for consumer transactions are actually to be built, 
the new approach offers a far more attractive way 
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to structure them. Its specific advantages to indivi-
duals, organizations, and society at large will be 
argued further in the final section. The interven-
ing three sections expand on its desirability and 
practicality for a comprehensive set of transaction 
types: communication, payments, and credentials. 
Payment systems now being piloted for 
widespread use with the current approach include 
tamper-resistant card computers issued by banks 
and electronic connections between banks and 
retailers. The same basic mechanisms, however, 
could be designed to carry out payment transac-
tions under the new approach. This in turn would 
allow new approach credential transactions to 
come naturally and gradually into use, with their 
applicability and benefits growing as computer and 
telecommunications infrastructures mature. The 
communication system proposed here would only 
begin to be practical with the advent of large-scale 
consumer electronic mail and would ·allow home 
use of the payment and credential systems. It is 
here presented first, however, since it most clearly 
illustrates some concepts central to the latter more 
immediately applicable systems. 
COMMUNICATION TRANSACTIONS 
As more messages travel in electromagnetic and 
digital form, it becomes easier to learn about indi-
viduals from their communication. Exposure of 
message content is one obvious danger, but this is 
already addressed by well-known coding 
techniques. A more subtle and difficult problem 
with current communication systems, however, is 
the exposure of "tracing information." An impor-
tant kind of tracing information today is individu-
als' addresses, which organizations often require 
and which they commonly sell as mailing lists. 
The trend is toward greater use of such informa-
tion. O:>mprehensive computerized data on who 
calls whom and when, for instance, are increas-
ingly being collected and maintained by telephone 
companies. Electronic mail systems, some new 
telephone systems, and the proposed integrated ser-
vices networks automatically deliver tracing infor-
mation with each message. When such informa-
tion is available on a mass basis, the pattern of 
each individual's relationships is laid bare. Furth-
ermore, tracing information can be used as an 
identifier to link together all the records on an 
individual that are held by organizations with 
whom that individual communicates. So long as 
communication systems allow system providers, 
organizations, or eavesdroppers to obtain tracing 
information, they are unsuitable for the new 
approach and, moreover, are a growing threat to 
individuals' ability to determine how information 
about themselves is used. 
The other side of the issue is that current sys-
tems offer organizations and society at large inade-
quate protection against individuals who forge 
messages or falsely claim not to have sent or 
received messages. With paper communication, 
handwritten signatures are easily forged well 
enough to pass routine checking against signature 
samples, and they cannot be verified with cer-
tainty, even by expert witnesses. Also, paper 
receipts for delivery are too costly for most transac-
tions, are often based solely on handwritten signa-
tures, and usually do not indicate message content. 
AS computerized systems come into wider use, 
moreover, the potential for abuse by individuals 
will increase. Solving these problems under the 
current approach might be attempted in several 
obvious ways: by providing recipients with the 
sender's address, by installing tamper-resistant 
identity-card readers or the like at every entry 
point to the communication system, and by keep-
ing records of all messages to allow certification of 
delivery. But these security measures are all based 
on tracing information and thus are in fundamen-
tal conflict with individuals' ability to monitor and 
control information about themselves. 
Both sets of problems are solved under the 
new approach. The nature of the solution is such 
that: individuals are able to send or receive mes-
sages without releasing any tracing information; 
receivers can show that messages were in fact sent 
to them, despite denial by the senders; senders can 
show that messages were in fact received, despite 
denial by the receivers; and message content is 
kept confidential. To make messages untraceable, 
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a person's electronic mail computer conceals, in an 
unconditionally secure way, which messages it 
sends and receives. To prevent denial by a sender, 
each sender cryptographically codes messages in a 
way that each receiver can check, but that 
prevents anyone from being able to imitate the 
sender's coded "signature." These two concepts-
untraceability and coded signatures- will recur 
intertwined in the payment and credential transac-
tion types and are presented in separate subsections 
below. 
Unconditional Untraceability 
It is easy, in principle, to prevent a message sent 
by an organization from being traced to its indivi-
dual recipient. The organization simply broadcasts 
all its messages to all individuals, and each 
individual's electronic mail computer then scans 
the broadcasts for messages addressed to any of its 
owner's pseudonyms. Thus only the individual's 
computer knows which of the broadcast messages 
its owner obtains. 
Preventing a message sent to an organization 
from being traced back to its individual sender, 
however, requires some novel techniques; since any 
physical transmission can, in principle, be traced to 
its source. The concept of these techniques is illus-
trated by a hypothetical situation. Suppose two of 
your friends invite you to dine at a restaurant. 
After dinner, the waiter comes to your table and 
mentions that one of the three of you has already 
paid for the dinner- but he does not say which 
one. If you paid, your friends want to know (since 
they invited you), but if one of them paid, they do 
not want you to be able to learn which one of 
them it was. 
The problem is solved at the table in the fol-
lowing simple way: Your friends flip a coin behind 
a menu so that they can see the outcome, but you 
cannot. It is agreed that each of them will say the 
outcome aloud, but that if one of them paid, that 
one will say the opposite of the actual outcome. 
The uninteresting case is when they both say heads 
or both say tails: then everyone knows that you 
paid. If one of them says heads and the other says 
tails, however, then you know that one of them 
paid- but you have absolutely no information as 
to which one. You do know that the one you 
observed say tails paid if the coin toss was heads, 
and that the other one paid if the coin toss was 
tails. But since heads and tails tosses are equally 
likely, you learn nothing from your two friends' 
utterances about which one of them paid. 
The system described allows the friend who 
paid to send you an unconditionally untraceable 
message; even though you know who says what, 
you cannot trace the "I paid" message, no matter 
how clever or prolonged your analysis. 
This hypothetical system can be generalized 
and made practical (as detailed in reference [ 1 ]). 
One such generalization uses additional coins to 
allow more potential senders at the table, while 
preventing tracing even by collusion. Another 
breaks long messages into a sequence of parts, each 
of which is dealt with in a separate round of coin 
tosses and utterances. In practical communication 
systems, each participant's electronic mail com-
puter would share secret numeric keys with other 
mail computers Uust as hosts shared coin tosses 
behind their menus). Each mail computer then 
uses these keys to produce transformed sequences of 
digits (like a sequence of outcomes uttered at the 
table), which it sends through the mail network. 
The network combines all these transmissions to 
recover the original messages, which it broadcasts 
back to the mail computers Uust as messages were 
audible and understandable to everyone at the 
table). 
Digital Signatures 
Now consider the problem of preventing senders 
from later disavowing messages they have sent. 
The solution is based on the concept of "digital sig-
natures," which was first proposed by Diffie and 
Hellman [ 4 ]. To see how this concept works, ima-
gine an old-fashioned codebook that is divided into 
two halves, like an English-French and French-
English dictionary, except that only English words 
are used. Thus, if you look up an English word in 
the front half of the codebook, you find the 
corresponding (but usually semantically unrelated) 
English code word; if you then look this code word 
up in the back half, you find your original English 
word. Such codebooks are constructed by pairing 
off words at random: in the front half of the book, 
the pairs are ordered by their first words, and in 
the back half by their second words. For instance, 
if under "spy" the front half shows "why," then 
under "why" the back half shows "spy." 
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If you construct such a codebook, you can 
use it in your communication with an organization. 
You keep the front half as your private key, and 
you give the back half to the organization as your 
digital pseudonym with that organization. Before 
sending a message to the organization, you 
translate each word of the message into code using 
your private key; this encoded form of the message 
is called a digital signature. When the organiza-
tion receives the digital signature from you, it 
translates it back to the original English message 
using your digital pseudonym. 
The immensely useful property of such digi-
tal signatures is their resistance to forgery. No 
one- not even the organization that has your digi-
tal pseudonym-can easily forge a digital signature 
of yours. Such forgery would entail creating some-
thing that your digital pseudonym decodes to a 
sensible English message. In the codebook anal-
ogy, of course, forgery merely requires searching 
through (or completely re-sorting by second words) 
the half of the book that is your digital pseudonym. 
With actual digital-signature cryptographic tech-
niques currently in use, however, forgery is thought 
to require so much computation as to be infeasible 
even for the fastest computers working for millions 
of years. If an organization cannot forge a digital 
signature of yours, then it cannot successfully claim 
that you sent it a message that you in fact did not 
send. A third-party arbiter would decide in favor 
of an organization only if the organization could 
show a digital signature that yields the disputed 
message when translated with your digital pseu-
donym. But, because forgery is infeasible, the 
organization could obtain such a digital signature 
only if you had "signed" (i.e., encoded) the 
disputed message using your private key. 
An organization could create its own private 
key and corresponding digital pseudonym (its own 
I will digitally sign 
the message 
'china syndrome' 
by translating each 
word using my 
private half 
codebook. 
The digitally signed form of E:J · 
my message is 'pages cat'. 
"codebook"); it would keep the private key (the 
front half) to itself, while widely disseminating the 
corresponding digital pseudonym (the back half). 
It would then use this private key to transform 
messages into digital signatures before sending 
them to individuals. The organization, unlike an 
individual, would create only a single private key 
and corresponding digital pseudonym, which it 
would use for all digital signatures it sends. Thus, 
anyone receiving a signed message from the orga-
nization would decode it using the organization's 
single, publicly disseminated digital pseudonym 
(commonly called a "public key"). These signa-
tures would allow individuals to convince the orga-
nization, or anyone else if necessary, that the mes-
sage had in fact been sent by the organization. In 
the payment and credential systems introduced in 
the following sections, such digital signatures 
formed by organizations play an important role. 
Digital Signatures in Practice 
Actual digital signatures are realized using 
numbers, and can be adapted to keep message 
content confidential and to certify delivery. 
Practical, computerized digital-signature 
techniques work just as in the codebook analogy 
above, except that everything is done with two-
hundred-digit numbers. Each private key, and 
each digital pseudonym, is represented as one such 
number (rather than as a half codebook); each 
unsigned message and each signature is also 
represented as such a number (rather than as a 
string of English words). A standard, publicly 
available mathematical procedure lets anyone use 
a private key to form a corresponding digital sig-
nature from a message; a similar procedure allows 
anyone to recover the original message using the 
matching digital pseudonym (just as the simple 
procedure for looking up words in either half of the 
codebook can be public, so long as the private key 
is not). Another public mathematical procedure 
allows anyone to create a private key and 
corresponding digital pseudonym from a random 
starting point (just as the two halves of a codebook 
could be generated from a random pairing of 
words). Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [5] pro-
posed such a numeric digital-signature technique, 
which seems to be highly secure against forgery 
and could underlie the systems presented here. 
Messages are kept confidential during 
transmission by using digital pseudonyms and 
private keys in a different way: before transmitting 
UNCONDITIONALLY UNTRACEABLE MESSAGES WITH NUMBERS are sent essentially as with words, except that 
everything Is represented as D's and 1's. Only the exclusive-or operation ffi Is used (defined as 1 ffiD = Dffi1=1 and 
DffiD = 1 ffi1 = D). The D or 1 outcome of the coin toss Is shown ask. A host wishing to send the "I paid" message, 
which Is represented as 1, transmits kffi1; a host not wishing to send the message transmits only k. When the guest 
forms the exclusive-or of the two transmissions, [1) and [2), the result Is 1 If one host sent the message and D If no 
host sent H-because k appears twice and cancels (since kffik= D and Dffi/= /). If there are more hosts at the table, 
each flips a coin and shares the outcome with the host to the left, skipping the guest. Each host then forms a 
transmission as the exclusive-or of the two outcomes the host shares, excluslve-or'ed with an additional 1 if the host 
Is sending the "I paid" message. Every coin toss appears twice and Is canceled In the exclusive-or that the guest 
forms from all the transmissions, and the result Is again 1 If a host paid and D If no host paid. In actual computer-
ized systems, real messages are encoded as sequences of D's and 1 's, and the whole protocol Is repeated with new 
k's for each digit to be sent. Senders noticing that their messages are being garbled by collision with other mes-
sages, wait randomly-chosen Intervals before attempting to resend. 
DIGITAL SIGNATURES WITH NUMBERS use special arithmetic systems, In which raising a number to a power i 
scrambles It, and raising to a corresponding power x unscrambles It: (mi)x=m. (The power i acts as the private 
half codebook, and the other power x acts as the corresponding half.) First the message Is encoded as a one-
hundred-digit number, and then the digits are repeated to form a two-hundred-digit number m wHh this special 
repeated-halves property. Next the signer raises the special number to a private power i and makes the result 
known to others In transmission [1). Someone receiving this digitally-signed message merely raises It to the 
corresponding digital-pseudonym power x and checks that the result has the special repeated-halves property. If it 
does, then the recipient knows that the message was signed by the holder of the corresponding private power. 
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a message, the sender first signs it and then 
encodes the result using the digital pseudonym of 
the intended recipient. Thus, the s~gned message 
can be recovered only by decoding the transmis-
sion using the intended recipient's private key. 
One way to protect against recipients falsely 
claiming not to have received messages is similar to 
the way paper mail is certified: messages are only 
given to recipients once they provide digitally 
signed "receipts" of delivery. Another method 
holds people responsible for messages that are 
made a matter of public record, like legal notices 
in newspapers. Since, under the new approach, 
messages are broadcast, they can be certified in 
this way at little additional expense. (A more fun-
damental advantage of making messages a matter 
of record is that it becomes easy to disprove false 
attributions of signatures- even if signatures could 
somehow be forged.) When this method is used 
with messages encoded for confidentiality, either 
party can display the signed message and point to 
the corresponding doubly encoded transmission in 
the public record as evidence that the message was 
available for receipt, since decoding the signed 
message with the digital pseudonym of the sender 
yields the message content, and encoding it with 
the pseudonym of the recipient yields the transmis-
sion in the public record. 
PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS 
The computerization of payments is givmg pay-
ment system providers and others easy access to 
extensive and revealing information about indivi-
duals through payments made for purchases from 
shops, subscriptions, donations, travel, entertain-
ment, professional services, and so on. Today, 
many paper records of when, how much, from 
whom, and to whom payment was made are 
translated into electronic form. The trend is 
toward capturing this payment data electronically, 
right at the point of sale. This facilitates the elec-
tronic capture of the potentially more revealing 
details of what was purchased. Moreover, comput-
erization is extending the data capture potential of 
payment systems in other ways. One is through 
emerging informational services like pay television 
and videotex; another is through new systems that 
directly connect central billing computers to things 
like electric-utility meters and automobile-
identification sensors buried in toll roads. Just as, 
in communication systems, tracing information 
links all of an individual's records with organiza-
tions, payment data containing an account 
identifier links all of an individual's relationships 
involving payments. 
From the other perspective, it is widely held 
that uncollectible payments made by consumers, 
such as credit card misuse and checks drawn 
against insufficient funds, cost society billions of 
dollars a year. Paper banknotes are vulnerable to 
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counterfeiting and theft, and their lack of audita-
bility makes them convenient for illicit payments 
such as bribes, extortion, and black-market pur-
chases. Limiting all these abuses while automating 
seems to call for highly pervasive and interlinked 
systems that capture and retain account identifiers 
as well as other payment data-which is in clear 
conflict with the interests of individuals. 
The nature of the new approach's solution to 
these problems ensures that organizations, even 
colluding with the payment system provider who 
maintains the accounts, cannot trace the flow of 
money between accounts. But the system provider 
does know the balance of each account, and if 
funds were to be transferred between accounts 
instantaneously, the simultaneous but opposite 
changes in balance would make tracing easy. 
Such tracing is prevented because funds are with-
drawn, held, and paid as multidenominational 
notes, in some ways like "unmarked bills." These 
notes are unlike paper banknotes, however, in that 
individuals, but not organizations, can allow 
transfers to be traced and audited whenever 
needed; this makes the notes unusable if stolen, 
and unattractive for many kinds of illicit payments. 
The fully computerized systems introduced here 
offer practical yet highly secure replacements for 
most current and proposed consumer payment sys-
tems (as detailed in [2]). 
Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments 
The new-approach payment systems are based on 
an exter.sion of digital signatures, called blind sig-
natures. This concept is illustrated by an analogy 
to carbon-paper-lined envelopes. If you seal a slip 
of paper inside such an envelope and a signature 
mark is later made on the outside, then when you 
open the envelope, the slip will bear the signature 
mark's carbon image. 
Consider how you might use such an 
envelope to make a payment. Suppose that a 
bank has a special signature mark that it guaran-
tees to be worth one dollar, in the sense that the 
bank will pay one dollar for any piece of paper 
with that mark on it. You take a plain slip of 
paper sealed in a carbon-lined envelope to the 
bank and ask to withdraw one dollar from your 
account. In response, the bank deducts one dollar 
from your account, makes the signatµre mark on 
the outside of your envelope, and returns it to you. 
You verify that your sealed envelope has been 
returned with the proper signature mark on it. 
Later, when you remove the slip from the 
envelope, it bears the carbon image of the bank's 
signature mark. You can then buy something for 
one dollar from a shop, using the signed slip to 
make payment. The shop verifies the carbon 
image of the bank's signature on the slip before 
accepting it. 
U N T R A C E A B L E  P A Y M E N T S  a r e  I l l u s t r a t e d  b y  a n  a n a l o g y  t o  e n v e l o p e s  a n d  c a r b o n  p a p e r .  T h e  l n d l v l d u a l  ( o r ,  I n  t h e  
c o m p u t e r i z e d  a n a l o g ,  t h e  c a r d )  s e a l s  a  b l a n k  s l i p  o f  p a p e r  a n d  a  f a c i n g  p i e c e  o f  c a r b o n  p a p e r  I n  a n  e n v e l o p e ,  a n d  
s u p p l i e s  I t  t o  t h e  b a n k .  T h e  b a n k  d e d u c t s  o n e  d o l l a r  f r o m  t h e  I n d i v i d u a l ' s  a c c o u n t ,  a p p l i e s  a  " w o r t h  o n e  d o l l a r "  s i g -
n a t u r e  ( s t a m p )  t o  t h e  o u t s i d e  o f  t h e  e n v e l o p e ,  a n d  r e t u r n s  t h e  u n o p e n e d  e n v e l o p e  t o  t h e  I n d i v i d u a l .  U p o n  r e c e i v i n g  
t h i s ,  t h e  l n d l v l d u a l  v e r i f i e s  t h e  b a n k ' s  v a l i d a t i n g  s i g n a t u r e .  B e f o r e  m a k i n g  p a y m e n t  s o m e t i m e  l a t e r ,  t h e  I n d i v i d u a l  r e -
m o v e s  t h e  e n v e l o p e  a n d  c a r b o n ,  l e a v i n g  o n l y  t h e  s i g n e d  s l i p  o f  p a p e r .  W h e n  t h e  s h o p  r e c e i v e s  t h e  s l i p ,  i t  v e r i f i e s  
t h e  c a r b o n  I m a g e  o f  t h e  v a l i d a t i n g  s i g n a t u r e  o n  t h e  s l l p ,  a n d  s u p p l i e s  I t  t o  t h e  b a n k  f o r  d e p o s i t .  A f t e r  a l s o  v e r i f y i n g  
t h e  s l i p ' s  v a l i d a t i n g  s i g n a t u r e ,  t h e  b a n k  h o n o r s  t h e  d e p o s i t ,  s i n c e  I t  k n o w s  t h e  s l i p  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  I n  a n  e n v e l o p e  I t  
s i g n e d .  T h e  b a n k  d o e s  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  k n o w  w h i c h  o f  t h e  m a n y  e n v e l o p e s  t h a t  I t  s i g n e d  c o n t a i n e d  t h e  s l i p ,  a n d  t h u s  
t h e  b a n k  c a n n o t  t r a c e  t h e  s l i p  t o  t h e  I n d i v i d u a l ' s  a c c o u n t .  I n  a c t u a l  c o m p u t e r i z e d  s y s t e m s ,  u n l e s s  t h e  I n d i v i d u a l  a l -
l o w s  t r a c i n g ,  w i t h d r a w a l s  o n  o n e  s i d e  o f  t h e  d a s h e d  b o u n d a r y  l i n e  a n d  p a y m e n t s  o n  t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  o f  I t  a r e  u n c o n d i -
t i o n a l l y  u n t r a c e a b l e  t o  e a c h  o t h e r - e v e n  I f  t h e  b a n k  a n d  a l l  o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  c o l l u d e .  
N o w  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  b a n k  w h e n  E x t e n d i n g  t h e  E n v e l o p e  A n a l o g y  
t h e  s l i p  i s  r e c e i v e d  f o r  d e p o s i t  f r o m  t h e  s h o p .  T h e  U s i n g  n o t e  n u m b e r s  p r o v i d e s  p r o t e c t i o n s  s i m i l a r  t o  
b a n k  v e r i f i e s  t h e  s i g n a t u r e  o n  t h e  s l i p  s u b m i t t e d  f o r  t h o s e  o f f e r e d  b y  c h e c k  n u m b e r s  t o d a y .  S i n c e  t h e  
d e p o s i t ,  j u s t  a s  t h e  s h o p  d i d ,  a n d  a d d s  a  d o l l a r  t o  b a n k  i s  u n a b l e  t o  s e e  i n t o  t h e  e n v e l o p e s ,  n o t h i n g  i s  
t h e  s h o p ' s  a c c o u n t .  B e c a u s e  t h e  s i g n a t u r e  v e r i f i e d ,  r e v e a l e d  t o  t h e  b a n k  b y  a  r a n d o m l y  c h o s e n  n o t e  
t h e  b a n k  k n o w s  t h a t  t h e  s l i p  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  i n  a n  n u m b e r  w r i t t e n  o n  t h e  s l i p  b e f o r e  i t  i s  s i g n e d .  
e n v e l o p e  t h a t  i t  s i g n e d .  B u t  n a t u r a l l y  t h e  b a n k  ( A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h e  s l i p ' s  u n i q u e ,  r a n d o m  p a p e r -
u s e s  e x a c t l y  t h e  s a m e  s i g n a t u r e  m a r k  t o  s i g n  m a n y  f i b e r  p a t t e r n  c o u l d  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  n o t e  n u m b e r . )  
s u c h  e n v e l o p e s  e a c h  d a y  f o r  a l l  o f  i t s  a c c o u n t  h o l d - S t o l e n  n o t e s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  a c c e p t e d  b y  t h e  b a n k  
e r s ,  a n d  s i n c e  a l l  s l i p s  w e r e  " b l i n d e d "  b y  e n v e l o p e s  o n c e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  w h o  w i t h d r e w  t h e  f u n d s  r e p o r t s  
d u r i n g  s i g n i n g ,  t h e  b a n k  c a n n o t  k n o w  w h i c h  t h e i r  n o t e  n u m b e r s .  W h e n  g i v e n  t h e s e  n u m b e r s ,  
e n v e l o p e  t h e  s l i p  w a s  i n .  T h e r e f o r e  i t  c a n n o t  l e a r n  t h e  b a n k  c a n  a l s o  a t t e s t  t o  t h e  a c c o u n t s  t o  w h i c h  
f r o m  w h i c h  a c c o u n t  t h e  f u n d s  w e r e  w i t h d r a w n .  f u n d s  h a v e  b e e n  d e p o s i t e d .  S u c h  t r a c e a b i l i t y  a t  
M o r e  g e n e r a l l y ,  t h e  b a n k  c a n n o t  d e t e r m i n e  w h i c h  t h e  p a y e r ' s  i n i t i a t i v e  w o u l d  d i s c o u r a g e  t h e  u s e  o f  
w i t h d r a w a l  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  w h i c h  d e p o s i t - t h e  p a y - t h e s e  s y s t e m s  i n  b r i b e r y ,  e x t o r t i o n ,  b l a c k  m a r k e t  
m e n t s  a r e  u n t r a c e a b l e .  p u r c h a s e s ,  a n d  o t h e r  i l l i c i t  p a y m e n t s :  r e c i p i e n t s  o f  
I n  a c t u a l  c o m p u t e r i z e d  s y s t e m s ,  b o t h  s l i p s  s u c h  p a y m e n t s  r i s k  h a v i n g  t h e i r  a c c o u n t s  t r a c e d  i f  
a n d  e n v e l o p e s  a r e  r e p l a c e d  b y  n u m b e r s ,  t h e  b a n k ' s  t h e y  d e p o s i t  t h e  n o t e s ,  a n d  b e i n g  a p p r e h e n d e d  o r  
s i g n a t u r e  m a r k  b e c o m e s  a  d i g i t a l  b l i n d  s i g n a t u r e ,  j u s t  d i s c o v e r i n g  t h a t  t h e  n o t e s  a r e  w o r t h l e s s  i f  t h e y  
a n d  p a y m e n t s  a r e  u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y  u n t r a c e a b l e  ( a s  t r y  t o  s p e n d  t h e m .  
d e s c r i b e d  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ) .  T h e  p r o t o c o l s  f o r  A  v a r i a t i o n  p r e v e n t s  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  ( e v e n  c o l -
t r a n s a c t i n g  w i t h d r a w a l s  a n d  p a y m e n t s  w o u l d  o f  l u d i n g  w i t h  b a n k s )  f r o m  t r a c i n g  t h e  a c c o u n t s  o f  
c o u r s e  b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  b y  t h e  c a r d  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  w h o m  t h e y  p a y  s u c h  t h i n g s  a s  
c o m p u t e r ;  i t s  o w n e r  w o u l d  m e r e l y  h a v e  t o  a l l o w  w a g e s ,  s e t t l e m e n t s ,  r e f u n d s ,  a n d  r e b a t e s .  T h e  i n d i -
e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  b y  e n t e r i n g  t h e  s e c r e t  a u t h o r i z i n g  v i d u a l  p l a c e s  a  s l i p  i n  a n  e n v e l o p e  a s  b e f o r e  a n d  
n u m b e r .  g i v e s  i t  t o  t h e  p a y i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  w h i c h  t h e n  s u p -
p l i e s  t h i s  b l i n d e d  s l i p  t o  t h e  b a n k .  T h e  b a n k ,  
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without knowing which individual is involved, signs 
the envelope and charges the paying organization's 
account. Signed but still blinded, the slip is 
returned by the organization to the individual, who 
verifies the signature, and later removes the 
envelope and deposits the slip with the bank. 
Other extensions to the basic concept offer 
replacements for today's payment systems attrac-
tive to both financial institutions and consumers. 
Regional clearing and signing centers would han-
dle most of the work and responsibility for banks 
on a wholesale basis, while the banks could off er 
their own customized services. Different signatures 
would be used for different denominations. An 
adaption allows routine transactions to be conswn-
mated in a way not requiring immediate or online 
interaction with a bank. Further variations permit 
the payment system to be used just as credit and 
debit cards are used today, with interest charges 
for credit and interest earnings on unspent debit-
card balances. 
Leaving the Analogy 
Actual payment systems would work very much 
along the lines of the envelope analogy, except that 
they use no paper, only numbers. A note number 
is first created by a true random process within the 
individual's card computer (used like the random 
number or fiber pattern on the slip of paper). 
Next, the card computer transforms the note 
number into a numeric note that is the equivalent 
of the message: "This is note number: 59 ... 2" (used 
like the slip of paper itself). The card computer 
then blinds this numeric note by combining it with 
a second random number (like the payer choosing 
an envelope at random and placing the slip in it). 
During withdrawal, the bank uses the private key 
of the desired denomination to form a digital signa-
ture on the blinded numeric note (like the signa-
ture mark made on the envelope). When the 
signed but still blinded note is returned, the card 
computer is able to unblind it by a process that 
removes the random blinding number from the 
digital signature while leaving the signature on the 
note (like the payer removing the envelope). Both 
the organization receiving payment and the bank 
use the bank's digital pseudonym to decode the sig-
nature; if the result is an appropriate message, this 
verifies the note's digital signature. 
A conceivable danger for the bank is that the 
same numeric note might be deposited more than 
once. To prevent this, a list of note numbers 
special · n 
random--r 
[1] -- n · rb 
[1] = n · rb 
[2] 
[3] -- (2] /r 
[3] 
[2] -- [1] 6 
[4] 
check ([3]b) 
[4] -- [3] 
UNTRACEABLE PAYMENTS WITH NUMBERS are made much as In the paper analogy. First the Individual's card 
computer chooses half the digits of n by a physical random process, and repeats these digits (actually In a scram-
bled form) to create the note number n with this special repeated-halves property (corresponding to choosing a suit-
able slip of paper at random In the analogy). The card also creates a totally random number r (like choosing an en-
velope and carbon). The card then raises the random number r to the bank's " worth one dollar" public power b, 
multiplies this by the note number n (like sealing the slip In the envelope), and supplies the result to the bank in 
transmission [1] . The bank deducts from the account, uses the corresponding private power 6 to sign the transmis-
sion, and returns the result to the card In [2]. The card verifies that the bank returned exactly the right thing, and 
obtains the signed note by dividing out the random r (like removing the envelope and carbon). When a payment Is 
made, the shop checks that transmission [3] Is a signed special number, and then forwards a copy [4] to the bank 
for deposit. The bank checks the signature just as the shop did, and accepts the deposit If the valld note has not al-
ready been deposited. If Individuals do not divulge the random r's their cards create, then the [1]'s are uncondition-
ally untraceable to the [4]'s, since there Is exactly one r that would make any [2] correspond with any [4]. 
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accepted for deposit is maintained and only note 
numbers not already on the list are accepted and 
recorded. The cost of maintaining such a list can 
be far less per transaction than the transaction cost 
of current payment systems, since expiration dates 
built into note numbers allow old numbers to be 
deleted from the list. 
Another conceivable danger is that the 
bank's digital signature could be forged, which 
would allow counterfeiting. The security against 
this kind of threat is based on the underlying 
digital-signature cryptographic technique, which is 
currently being proposed as an international stan-
dard and is already used by banks and even by 
nuclear agencies. The odds of someone guessing a 
valid, signed numeric note, or of any two indepen-
dently chosen note numbers being the same in the 
foreseeable future, are less than 1 in 10 to the 75th 
power. 
The numeric notes are unconditionally 
untraceable: the bank cannot learn anything from 
the numbers about the correspondence between 
withdrawals and deposits. In the hypothetical res-
taurant situation, both outcomes of each coin toss 
were equally likely, which meant that every 
correspondence between senders and messages was 
equally likely. Similarly, because all suitable 
numbers are equally likely to be used for the 
independent blinding of each note, all correspon-
dences between withdrawals and deposits are 
equally likely. 
CREDENTIAL TRANSACTIONS 
In their relationships with many organizations, 
there are legitimate needs for individuals to show 
credentials. The term "credentials" is used here to 
mean statements concerning an individual that are 
issued by organizations, and are in general shown 
to other organizations. In the past, credentials pri-
marily took the form of certificates like passports, 
driver's licenses, and membership cards. Before 
computerization, such certificates provided indivi-
duals with substantial control over access to their 
credentials, though the certificates also often 
revealed unnecessary and identifying information 
like address, birthdate, and various numbers. 
Today, such identifying information is being used 
to link records on certificate holders; it even allows 
them to be "blacklisted" or denied services because 
of reports from organizations that may be errone-
ous, obsolete, or otherwise inappropriate for the 
decision at hand. Where no substantiating 
certificate is required to be shown, as with applica-
tion or tax forms, much similarly unnecessary or 
overly detailed information is demanded, presum-
ably to allow confirmation. But confirmation itself 
can link further information and lead back to inap-
propriate records. The control over credential 
information that certificates once provided to indi-
viduals is thus being circumvented and rendered 
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illusory by computerization. 
The countervailing problem is that creden-
tials are subject to widespread abuse by individu-
als, who can easily modify or copy many kinds of 
paper and plastic certificates with today's technol-
ogy. This is one reason why certificates are in 
effect being reduced to the role of providing identi-
fying information, and organizations are maintain-
ing the credentials themselves. To check on 
unsubstantiated credential information, organiza-
tions are also rapidly deploying so-called matching 
techniques, whereby they use identifying informa-
tion to link and share records on individuals. 
Many organizations may also need the ability to 
blacklist individuals or to determine whether they 
are already blacklisted. As the number of such 
organizations grows, certificates or even matching 
techniques become impractical, hence the creation 
of large centralized databases on individuals. The 
use of multiple complete identities by sophisticated 
criminals is a related problem. As with communi-
cation and payments, the obvious countermeasures 
under the current approach- widespread use of 
highly secure identity documents linked to cen-
trally maintained credentials- are in direct conflict 
with individuals' ability to determine how informa-
tion about themselves is used. 
With the new approach's solution, an indivi-
dual can transform a specially coded credential 
issued under one pseudonym into a similarly coded 
form of the same credential, which can be shown 
under the individual's other pseudonyms. Since 
these coded credentials are maintained and shown 
only by individuals, they return control similar to 
that formerly provided by certificates; and since 
they are convenient to use, they obviate the need 
for unsuhstantiated credentials and for matching. 
Individuals can also tailor the coded form they 
show to ensure that only appropriate information is 
revealed or used to make particular decisions, and 
can ensure that obsolete information becomes 
unlinkable to current pseudonyms. Abuses of 
credentials by individuals, such as forgery and 
improper modification or sharing, are prevented by 
the cryptographic coding and the protocols for its 
use. Since each person is able to have at most one 
pseudonym with any organization requiring such 
protection, multiple complete identities are also 
prevented. Moreover, accountability for abuses 
perpetrated under any of an individual's pseu-
donyms can still be assured, without the need for 
centralized databases. 
The Basic Credential System 
The essential concept is again illustrated by anal-
ogy to carbon-lined envelopes, only this time the 
envelopes have windows. First, you make up 
numeric pseudonyms at random and write them on 
a plain slip of paper. When you want to get a 
credential from an organization, you put the slip in 
a carbon-lined envelope with a window exposing 
only the pseudonym you use with that organiza-
tion. Upon getting the envelope from you, the 
organization makes a special signature mark in a 
repeating pattern across the outside of it, and the 
carbon lining transfers the pattern to the slip. This 
signature pattern is the credential; the type of pat-
tern corresponds to the kind of credential the issu-
ing organization decides to give you, according to 
the pseudonym they see through the window. 
When you get the envelope back from the issuing 
organization, you verify the credential signature 
pattern. Before showing the credential to another 
organization, you place the slip in a different 
envelope with a window position that exposes only 
the pseudonym you use with that organization, 
along with some of the adjacent credential signa-
ture pattern. The receiving organization can ver-
ify, through the window, the pseudonym you use 
with it as well as the signature pattern. In this 
way, you can obtain and show a variety of creden-
tials. 
An organization can ensure that no indivi-
dual is able to transact with it under more than 
one pseudonym. One way an individual could 
attempt to use more than a single pseudonym with 
an organization is to use different pseudonyms on 
the same slip of paper. This is prevented by a 
standard division of the slip into positional zones, 
such that each zone is assigned to a particular 
organization; an envelope is accepted by an orga-
nization only if the window position exposes that 
organization's zone, bearing a single indelibly writ-
ten pseudonym. A second way of attempting to 
use more than one pseudonym per organization is 
to use more than one slip. This is prevented by 
the establishment of an agency that issues a single 
"is-a-person" credential signature to each indivi-
dual. Other organizations accept only envelopes 
with this signature recognizable through the win-
dow. The agency ensures that it issues no more 
than one signature per person by taking, say, a 
thumbprint and checking that the print is not 
already on file before giving the signature. This 
collection of prints poses little danger to individu-
als, however, since the prints cannot be linked to 
anything. 
The pseudonyms used by individuals are 
untraceable, in the sense that envelopes give no 
clue, apart from the signatures shown, about the 
other randomly chosen pseudonyms they contain. 
Actual systems based on card computers would 
provide unconditional untraceability using digital 
blind signatures on numbers (as detailed in [3]). 
rut 
~ 
credential 
issuing 
organization 
x 
-· -· 
-· 
credential 
receiving 
organization 
y 
-·-· 
UNTRACEABLE CREDENTIAL TRANSFERS BETWEEN PSEUDONYMS are Illustrated by an analogy to window en-
velopes and carbon paper. The lndlvldual writes the pseudonyms on a sllp and seals It, along with a facing piece of 
carbon paper, In an envelope the window of which exposes only the pseudonym 523 used with organization X. Then 
X applies a signature (stamp) on the outside of the envelope received, having chosen C as the repeating pattern that 
Indicates the kind of credential Issued. The lndlvldual verifies the signature returned. When the lndlvldual later 
wishes to show the credential to organization Y, the original envelope and carbon are discarded, and the slip Is 
placed in a new envelope the window of which exposes only the pseudonym 965 used by the Individual with Y. Now 
Y verifies the signature through the window of the envelope and knows that 965 has been Issued credential C. Orga-
nization Y cannot, however, learn the other pseudonyms written on the slip. Actual computerized systems maintain 
the unconditlonal untraceablllty of pseudonyms across the dashed boundary llne. 
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[2] 
[2]c ~ [1.2] 
(3.3] <-- [2] · Sy I Sx 
[1.1] - f(u · sf)i 
[1.2] - u ·sf 
[1.1]z ~ f([1.2]) 
[2J - [1.2Jc 
[3.1] 
[3.2] 
f(u. s{)i 
- u·sff 
[3.3) = Uc· Sy 
[3.1]z ~ f([3.2]) 
[3.3] c ~ [3.2] 
UNTRACEABLE CREDENTIALS WITH NUMBERS also follow the paper analogy. The so-called "one-way" function f 
Is easily computed by a publicly known procedures, but Its Inverse Is thought to be Infeasible to compute. Organiza-
tion X determines the validity of both transmissions It receives, [1.1] and [1.2], by verifying that the first Is a signa-
ture on the one-way function of the second. Later, X provides the signature for the desired credential on [1.2]. The 
card verifies the signature received as [2], and replaces sx by sy. Organization Y verifies [3.1] and [3.2] just as X 
did for [1.1] and [1.2]. Upon receiving the credential [3.3], Y verifies that It Is a signed copy of [3.2]. 
Not illustrated Is how a special organization Z ensures that the [1.1]'s (and [3.1]'s) are of the proper form, but does 
not obtain Information useful In tracing. First, the card supplies many candidates to Z, each of the form 
qn= f(u·sR)· I~, where u Is the special pseudonym used by the Individual with Z, and Sn= f(sf,) and In = f(lf,), with 
s;, and 1;, created at random by the card. When the card later learns which candidates qn have been selected at ran-
dom for Inspection by Z, the card supplies the corresponding s;, and 1;, for each. This allows Z to verify that 
qn= f(u· f(sf,)C) · f(l;,)z. If all Inspected candidates verify, then Z supplies the signed form of all unlnspected candi-
dates. The card transforms a signed candidate Into [1.1], for example, by dividing out Ix. (In one extension, the 
chance that Improper candidates are used successfully can be kept negligibly small by Z returning signatures only 
on products of candidates. In another, using s's as exponents with bases that are known generators having public 
signatures allows an unlimited number of signature types c1-) 
Revealing Only Necessary Infonnation 
You need not show all your credentials to every 
organization; you can restrict what you show to 
only what is necessary. Because of the way the 
credential signature patterns repeat across the slips, 
a recognizable part of each signature pattern 
appears adjacent to each pseudonym. To prevent 
certain credentials from being seen, though, you 
could simply black out parts of an envelope's win-
dow when showing it to an organization. But 
more flexible restrictions are possible using your 
card computer. It serves as the single database of 
all your credentials- and you alone control which 
queries from organizations it answers. 
A typical such query might be: "Does the 
owner of pseudonym 72 .. .4 have credentials 
sufficient to meet the requirement: ... ?" Your card 
can issue a convincing affirmative response only 
when it does in fact have credential signatures 
satisfying the requirement. But the card ensures-
unC:onditionally- that organizations cannot learn 
any more about your credentials from its responses 
than the affirmations themselves. You might use it 
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to convince an organization that your age, income, 
and education, for instance, meet their entry 
requirements in at least one way, without revealing 
any more than just that fact. Or, when a survey 
requires credentials for substantiating responses, 
using a different pseudonym for each response 
ensures that no more is revealed than the total 
number of each type of response. 
Actual queries and responses can be realized 
as follows: an organization encodes a new creden-
tial into the query message itself, in such a way 
that the credential can be decoded using any one 
of several qualifying combinations of other creden-
tials as the key. If any qualifying combination is 
held, then this new credential can be decoded and 
shown to the organization as the response. It can 
also be retained for later use, which additionally 
permits the gradual replacement of older and more 
detailed credentials by more appropriate summary 
ones. When such query messages are made public 
so that everyone can use them, they provide for 
public and verifiable rules for decisions about indi-
viduals. 
Some Uses of Credentials 
The new approach supports most varieties of 
credentials used today. Some of these, like educa-
tional degrees, are lifelong, while others, like stu-
dent cards, are valid only for prescribed periods. 
Still others, like membership cards, usually have 
long-term validity, but their certificates typically 
expire at the end of each year, thereby allowing 
their issuers to effectively revoke the credential by 
withholding new certificates. 
A less common but still used kind of creden-
tial allows organizations in effect to blacklist indivi-
duals, without maintaining a central list of identi-
ties. Suppose, for example, that credentials are 
issued for filing tax forms, so that each adult 
citizen should get such a credential every year. 
Organizations might routinely modify their queries 
to include the requirement that adult citizens have 
filed tax forms for the last year. This would black-
list those who had not complied by barring them 
from relationships with organizations. 
In actual widespread use, where many orga-
nizations may occasionally need to blacklist some 
individuals, such a mechanism is neither practical 
nor desirable: queries would have to demand vast 
numbers of credentials, while individuals would be 
unable to protect themselves against being black-
listed by organizations even with which they have 
had no contact. 
Authorized Blacklisting Without Lists 
These problems of wider use can be solved by 
techniques that require an organization to obtain, 
directly from an individual, the authorization to 
blacklist that individual for a specified reason. 
Organizations would insist on such authorizations 
as are appropriate before establishing or extending 
relationships. 
The way these techniques work is illustrated 
by applying the envelope analogy to buying goods 
on credit. A special row of zones is reserved on 
each slip for this purpose. You provide the shop 
where you make the credit purchase with an 
envelope that has (in addition to any window you 
may ordinarily use with that shop) a window 
exposing one of these reserved zones. The shop 
first broadcasts the numeric pseudonym it sees 
indelibly written in that reserved zone, so that 
when no other organization objects, the shop is 
assured exclusive use of that zone. 
When you later pay the shop, it gives you a 
resolution credential signature mark; unlike the 
credential signature marks previously described, it 
is made only on the single zone to which it applies. 
If some of the reserved zones remain unused, you 
can show them to a "voiding" agency that obtains 
exclusive use of these unneeded zones in the same 
way as do shops, and then issues a resolution signa-
ture mark on each. 
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Only when you repay by deadline all due 
loans can you obtain resolution signature marks on 
each zone of the reserved row. Then you can 
demonstrate that you are not blacklisted, without 
revealing more, just by showing that all of your 
reserved zones have their resolution signatures. 
You do this by presenting an envelope that has a 
slit-shaped window positioned over the reserved 
row. It exposes only a narrow band of each 
reserved zone's resolution credential signature, 
while concealing the pseudonym-bearing parts of 
the zones that were shown separately to lenders or 
the voiding agency. In actual systems, card com-
puters would obtain and show digital signatures for 
this purpose as part of their general management 
of the reserved row. 
Preventing Use of Untimely Information 
The mechanisms of the new approach can both 
guarantee individuals time to review credential 
information before it is required, and uncondition-
ally ensure them the ability to shed such informa-
tion once it is outdated. 
If individuals can expect to receive their 
resolution credentials some "cooling-oW' interval 
before they are needed, instead of at the last 
minute, then there may be time to resolve errors or 
disputes before any unnecessary consequences 
occur. Organizations may not wish to increase the 
maximum delay before blacklisting takes effect, but 
some cooling-off interval can always be provided 
without doing so. For example, when a different 
resolution credential is valid for each calendar 
month and organizations provide them just before 
the beginning of the month, then the maximum 
delay before blacklisting takes effect is one month 
and there is no cooling-off interval. But this same 
maximum delay can be maintained while provid-
ing cooling-off intervals half a month long: twice a 
month, organizations issue credentials that expire a 
month after their issue date, so that a credential 
remains valid for a half-month interval following 
the scheduled issue of its successor. 
If individuals change pseudonyms periodi-
cally, they cannot be linked to obsolete informa-
tion. The initial information associated with new 
pseudonyms would be provided through the 
transfer of credentials from previous pseudonyms. 
The changeovers could be staggered to allow time 
for completion of pending business. 
There are additional benefits to changing 
pseudonyms beyond the weeding-out of obsolete 
information. For one thing, the periodic reduction 
to essentials prevents organizations from gradually 
accumulating information that might ultimately be 
used to link pseudonyms. Moreover, for individu-
als to be able to transfer all the initial information 
for a period, they must know each organization's 
information demands, they must know where each 
piece of information comes from, and they must 
consent to each such transfer. Information linkable 
by each organization is thus known to and agreed 
on by individuals- that is, individuals can monitor 
and control it. 
MICRO- AND MACROCOMPARISONS 
Advantages to Individuals 
As the public becomes more aware of the extent 
and possibilities of emerging information technol-
ogy, there should be a growing demand for the 
kinds of systems described here. Compared to the 
current approach, individuals stand to gain 
increased convenience and reliability; improved 
protection against abuses by other individuals and 
by organizations; monitorability and control; and 
full access to transaction systems. 
Increased convenience derives from the free-
dom of individuals to obtain their card computers 
from any source, to use whatever hardware or 
software they choose, and to interface with com-
munication systems wherever they please. This 
permits card computers to be adapted to the 
requirements of sophisticated, naive, and handi-
capped users alike. The systems need be no more 
complicated to use than under the current 
approach; people might choose never to actually 
see their pseudonyms or to be concerned with other 
implementation details. 
The individual is ensured reliable system 
access by a numeric key with which the card com-
puter encodes backup copies of its contents, and 
which allows a replacement card to recover these 
contents. Since this key should be 40 or more 
digits in size, it might be impractical for its owner 
to remember. Known techniques allow the key to 
be divided into parts, each of which can be given 
to a different trustee. This provides certain subsets 
of the trustees with the ability to recover the key, 
while insufficient subsets would be unable to learn 
anything about it. Still other subsets, given parts 
of the owner's secret authorizing number, would be 
able to take over the owner's affairs when needed. 
These provisions are an example of how an 
individual's power to designate proxies, a power 
now enjoyed by organizations, is ensured. 
Abuse of a lost or stolen card computer by 
another individual would be very difficult without 
the owner's secret authorizing number, as asserted 
earlier. This is because the card would require the 
authorizing number, which might typically be 
about six digits long, before allowing transactions. 
A reasonably tamper-resistant device within the 
card computer could: read fingerprints or the like 
to prevent use by anyone but the card owner; 
accept a special authorizing number that the 
owner could use in case of duress to trigger a pre-
arranged protective strategy; and permit only the 
current owner to reset the card for a new owner, to 
prevent its use as a replacement by a thief. Even if 
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sophisticated criminals were to extract the card's 
information content, and the owner were not to 
cancel in time using backup data, a great many 
guesses at the authorizing number might have to 
be tried with organizations before the actual 
number could be determined. This would make 
such attacks very likely to be detected and to fail. 
The new approach protects individuals 
unconditionally from abuses by organizations, such 
as the false attribution of messages, and from orga-
nizations blacklisting without advance warning. 
Moreover, individuals are provided with secure 
relationships without ever having to sacrifice the 
protection of their pseudonyms by revealing linking 
information- but they can always do so if they 
choose. While it is relatively easy for individuals 
to provide convincing evidence only of their role in 
particular transactions, it is even possible for them 
to provide evidence that they were not involved in 
certain other transactions. For example, in com-
munication transactions, individuals could show 
that their physical entry to the system was not used 
to send a particular message; in payment transac-
tions, they could show that a payment did not 
involve their account; and in credential transac-
tions, they could show that a pseudonym was not 
among the set obtainable under their thumbprint. 
The primary way that individuals gain moni-
torability and control is through their ability to 
prevent linking. Some linking of separate relation-
ships might occur if, for instance, a consumer actu-
ally wanted to be recognized, or as part of an 
investigation or other exceptional situation. But 
the linking of some relationships does not, in gen-
eral, allow others to be linked, and the regular 
changing of pseudonyms allows linkings to be shed 
over time. In addition, the scope of an individual's 
separate, unlinkable relationships need not depend 
on the legal or administrative structure of the orga-
nizations involved; an individual might use the 
same pseudonym with different organizations or, 
when allowed, different pseudonyms with the same 
organization. Naturally, the scope of relationships, 
along with such things as the level of detail in 
credentials and the frequency of pseudonym 
changeover, must be adjusted to provide the 
desired degree of protection against inference by 
statistical or pattern recognition techniques. Such 
protections would likely create a widespread expec-
tation of control over information; thus, as similar 
expectations have done in the past, it might also 
engender commensurate legal safeguards. 
Individuals would have the same access to 
systems as organizations, in addition to enjoying 
the same protections; such parity is precluded 
under the current approach in efforts to protect the 
security of organizations. A new-approach pay-
ment, for example, could be made between two 
friends using their card computers. A small busi-
ness would even be able to handle all customer 
transactions, using only a card computer. 
Advantages to Organizations 
Organizations have an interest in cultivating the 
goodwill of individuals. But they gain further 
direct benefits from the advantages to individuals 
described earlier, since in making their own tran-
sactions, they have many of the same concerns as 
individuals. Moreover, the new approach offers 
them reductions in cost; reductions in the quantity 
and sensitivity of necessary data; and improved 
security against detectable, undetectable, and 
extrasystemic abuses. 
The systems described here would be less 
costly for organizations than comparable systems 
based on the logical extension of the current 
approach. This is primarily because the latter 
requires widely trusted, tamper-resistant devices at 
all points of entry to transaction systems. Such a 
requirement implies substantial initial agreement, 
outlay, and commitment to design, and can be 
expected to result in technology that is outdated 
when systems come into widespread use. Further-
more, the tamper resistance techniques currently 
contemplated require significant compromise in 
security, even at high cost. The new-approach sys-
tem provider need not supply user organizations 
with tamper-resistant terminal equipment for each 
entry point, any more than than it need supply 
card computers to individuals. Thus, user organi-
zations can supply their own terminal equipment 
wherever they please and take advantage of the 
latest technology. Although these cards and termi-
nals make more sophisticated use of cryptographic 
techniques than does equipment envisioned under 
the current approach, this difference between the 
two is just a fraction of a chip in the technologies 
of the near future. 
The new approach reduces the sensitivity 
and the quantity of consumer data in the hands of 
organizations; by the same token, it reduces their 
exposure to incidents that might incur legal liabil-
ity or hurt their public images. Reductions in data 
could also streamline operations, and the increased 
appropriateness of the remaining data could pro-
vide a better basis for decision making. As elec-
tronic mail replaces paper mail, individuals' com-
puters may routinely reject unsolicited commercial 
messages and instead seek out only desired infor-
mation. Thus, data for targeting such messages 
might become superfluous even under the current 
approach. The new approach's protections, how-
ever, may compensate by making individuals less 
reluctant to provide information for surveys and 
the like. 
Under either approach, if an automated 
transaction system detects sufficiently serious abuse 
or default by an individual, the best it can do is to 
lock that individual out. This is because the indi-
vidual can always step outside such a system's con-
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trols by "going underground." The new-approach 
systems can lock individuals out, but can also have 
a cooling-off interval built in to allow matters to be 
resolved before lockout is needed. The approach 
also reduces the need for such measures, however, 
since its mechanisms allow organizations or society 
at large the flexibility to set policy that establishes 
a desired balance between prior restraint, as in the 
basic payment system, and accountability after the 
fact, as with credit or other authorized blacklisting 
fonctions. 
Undetectable abuse by individuals acting 
alone seems to be precluded by the systems of the 
new approach. But no transaction system is able 
to detect an individual who obtains something 
through legitimate use of the system and then 
transfers it to another person by some means out-
side the system. Transferring the ability to use a 
communication system to others is an instance of 
the proxy power already mentioned, which could 
be inhibited under the current approach. In the 
context of the payment system, such transfers can 
be treated as illicit payments, which are deterred 
by the use of note numbers. The credential system 
directly prevents the transfer of credentials from 
the pseudonyms of one person to those of another. 
Currently, "in-person" proxy is prevented by 
certificates bearing photos. Such photo tokens 
could still be used with the new approach, if and 
when needed; but they might include only a photo, 
an indication of the kind of credential, and possibly 
a digital pseudonym. 
Meanwhile, it is too easy to step outside 
current transaction systems by using coin phones, 
sending anonymous letters, dealing in cash, and 
using false credentials. Significantly improved 
security, particularly against more sophisticated 
abuse, can only be obtained with comprehensive 
automated systems. But such systems under the 
current approach may meet with broad-based 
resistance from individuals- especially once they 
become aware of the alternatives posed by the new 
approach. 
Implications for the Future 
Large-scale automated transaction systems are 
imminent. As the initial choice for their architec-
ture gathers economic and social momentum, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to revei:se. Which-
ever approach prevails, it will likely have a pro-
found and enduring impact on economic freedom, 
democracy, and our informational rights. 
Restrictions on economic freedom may be 
furthered under the current approach. Markets 
are often manipulable by parties with special 
access to information about other participants' 
transactions. Information service providers and 
other major interests, for example, could retain 
control over various information and media distri-
bution channels while synergistically consolidating 
their position with sophisticated marketing tech-
niques that rely on gathering far-reaching informa-
tion about consumers. Computerization has 
already allowed these and other organizations to 
grow to unprecedented size and influence; if con-
tinued along current lines, such domination might 
be increased. But the computerization of informa-
tion gathering and dissemination need not lead to 
centralization: integrating the payment system 
presented here with communication systems can 
give individuals and small organizations equal and 
unrestricted access to information distribution 
channels. Moreover, when information about the 
transactions of individuals and organizations is par-
titioned into separate, unlinkable relationships, the 
trend toward large-scale gathering of such informa-
tion, with its potential for manipulation and domi-
nation of markets, can be reversed. 
Attempts to computerize under the current 
approach threaten democracy as well. They are, 
as mentioned, likely to engender widespread oppo-
sition; the resulting stalemate would yield security 
mechanisms incapable of providing adequate prior 
restraint, thus requiring heavy surveillance, based 
on record linking, for security. This surveillance 
might significantly chill individual participation 
and expression in group and public life. The 
inadequate security and the accumulation of per-
sonally identifiable records, moreover, pose 
national vulnerabilities. Additionally, the same 
sophisticated data acquisition and analysis tech-
niques used in marketing are being applied to 
manipulating public opinion and elections as well. 
The opportunity exists, however, not only to 
reverse all these trends, by providing acceptable 
security without increased surveillance, but also to 
strengthen democracy. Voting, polling, and sur-
veys, for example, could be conveniently conducted 
via the new systems; respondents could show 
relevant credentials pseudonymously, and central-
ized coordination would not be needed. 
The new approach provides a practical basis 
for two new informational human rights that is 
unobtainable under the current approach. One is 
the right of individuals to parity with organizations 
in transaction system use. This is established in 
practice by individuals' parity in protecting them-
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selves against abuses, resolving disputes, conferring 
proxy, and offering services. The other is the right 
of individuals to disclose only the minimum infor-
mation necessary: in accessing information sources 
and distribution channels, in transactions with 
organizations, and- more fundamentally- in all 
the interactions that comprise an individual's infor-
mational life. 
Advances in information technology have 
always been accompanied by major changes in 
society: the transition from tribal to larger 
hierarchical forms, for example, was accompanied 
by written language, and printing technology 
helped to foster the emergence of large-scale demo-
cracies. Coupling computers with telecommunica-
tions creates what has been called the ultimate 
medium-it is certainly a big step up from paper. 
One might then ask: To what forms of society 
could this new technology lead? The two 
approaches appear to hold quite different answers. 
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